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In indoor rock climbing, the perception of object properties and the adequate execution
of grasping actions highly determine climbers’ performance. In two consecutive
experiments, effects of climbing expertise on the cognitive activation of grasping actions
following the presentation of climbing holds was investigated. Experiment 1 evaluated the
representation of climbing holds in the long-term memory of climbers and non-climbers
with the help of a psychometric measurement method. Within a hierarchical splitting
procedure subjects had to decide about the similarity of required grasping postures.
For the group of climbers, representation structures corresponded clearly to four grip
types. In the group of non-climbers, representation structures differed more strongly
than in climbers and did not clearly refer to grip types. To learn about categorical
knowledge activation in Experiment 2, a priming paradigm was applied. Images of hands
in grasping postures were presented as targets and images of congruent, neutral, or
incongruent climbing holds were used as primes. Only in climbers, reaction times were
shorter and error rates were smaller for the congruent condition than for the incongruent
condition. The neutral condition resulted in intermediate performance. The findings
suggest that perception of climbing holds activates the commonly associated grasping
postures in climbers but not in non-climbers. The findings of this study give evidence
that the categorization of visually perceived objects is fundamentally influenced by the
cognitive-motor potential for interaction, which depends on the observer’s experience and
expertise. Thus, motor expertise not only facilitates precise action perception, but also
benefits the perception of action-relevant objects.
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INTRODUCTION
Rock climbing requires a multitude of physical and cognitive abil-
ities, as well as their well concerted interaction. One of them is
the ability to perceive properties of climbing holds and to execute
adequate grasping actions. In indoor climbing, the athlete’s goal
is to reach the top of a climbing wall by using specific climbing
holds that are arranged as routes of different skill requirements.
The shape, orientation and relative position as well as the combi-
nation of holds thereby determines the adequate grasp and step
techniques. Apprehending climbing holds correctly is crucial for
planning corresponding actions, and thereby for optimizing the
climber’s performance (Boschker et al., 2002). Thus, the ability to
assign optimal grasps to the reachable holds is a relevant part of a
climber’s specific cognitive expertise (Pezzulo et al., 2010).
The cognitive aspects of expertise in the domain of rock or
indoor climbing have hardly been investigated. One of the rare
experimental studies on cognitive issues of climbing expertise has
been conducted by Pezzulo et al. (2010), who investigated the
ability of novice and expert climbers to memorize climbing routes
from presented photographs. Cognitive performance was mea-
sured as number of recalled grips in the correct sequence of a
route. The main finding was that expert climbers outperformed
novices in recalling the sequence of climbing holds of a difficult
climbing route that could only be climbed by experts, but not in
recalling an easy route that could be climbed both by experts and
novices. The authors argued that having the motor competence
to climb a visually perceived route enables climbers to mentally
simulate mastering it, and that this motor simulation improves
the climbers’ recall of the grip sequence. Moreover, as partic-
ipants were not explicitly instructed to mentally simulate the
required climbing actions, it was suggested that visually perceiv-
ing a climbing route automatically activates the corresponding
action sequence in skilled climbers.
Automatic activation of motor components of grasping
actions has also been found in other contexts, for example, when
participants had to classify kitchen objects or tools (Labeye et al.,
2008), or manufactured and natural objects (Tucker and Ellis,
2001, 2004; Grèzes et al., 2003). Labeye et al. (2008) investigated
the processing of object features (kitchen tools vs. do-it-yourself
(DIY) tools) and action features (implied actions performed with
each tool). Participants had to categorize target pictures as kitchen
tools or DIY tools. The targets were preceded by a prime picture
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either depicting a kitchen tool or a DIY tool. Both the object
(same vs. different category) and the action features (similar
vs. dissimilar implied action) were independently manipulated
between the prime and the target pictures. Object and action fea-
tures independently led to faster processing if they were from the
same category or implied similar actions, respectively, compared
to different categories or dissimilar actions. Labeye et al. (2008)
argued that perceiving the prime picture automatically activates
the motor components of the action that may potentially be per-
formed with regard to the object (see also Ellis and Tucker, 2000;
Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Bub and Masson, 2010; Masson et al.,
2011).
Studies investigating well-known everyday objects (e.g.,
kitchen tools) suggest that such object representations are asso-
ciated with certain grasping actions (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 2004;
Labeye et al., 2008). These associations may emerge as a con-
sequence of associated action experience. To further investigate
the role of motor experience for object-based action activations,
laboratory training studies have been conducted (Creem-Regehr
et al., 2007; Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007; Cross et al.,
2012; Bellebaum et al., 2013). After a training period in which
participants explicitly learnt to use objects in a tool-like man-
ner, the manipulation experience became a part of participants’
object representations and were automatically activated when the
objects were perceived (e.g., Weisberg et al., 2007).
A sports context provides a suitable scenario for investigat-
ing expertise effects in object-related action knowledge. Climbing
holds have been artificially designed to be used in indoor climb-
ing and are encountered exclusively in this context. Accordingly,
people who do not practice indoor climbing have no manipula-
tion experience with climbing holds, whereas sport climbers who
frequently train on indoor climbing walls have a large amount of
specific manipulation experience. Yet, climbing holds are objects
from which particular manipulation potential might be inferred
even by non-climbers based on the perceivable shape-properties
of the object. Comparing non-climbers’ and climbers’ processing
of climbing holds therefore provides a suitable scenario to dissoci-
ate the role of grasping experience and physical object properties
in the representation and processing of grasping actions.
Climbing is not a sport performed under time pressure (except
speed climbing; Florine and Wright, 2004). However, automatic
activations of single grasping actions are an important aspect of
a climber’s performance. The immediate activation of a grasp-
ing action to a perceived climbing hold might decrease cognitive
effort in short-term memory and thus save cognitive resources
necessary for further action planning (Spiegel et al., 2013).
Besides, the direct activation of a grasping action also allows
a quick action execution and may thus prevent high energy
costs arising when a climber has to remain in a static position
evaluating the next action possibility. Based on these considera-
tions, the present study examines object-related action knowledge
(Experiment 1) and automatic action activation (Experiment 2)
based on perceived climbing holds.
To investigate knowledge representations of climbing-specific
grasping actions, Experiment 1 evaluated the relevant cogni-
tive structures of grasping actions related to typical climbing
holds in the long-term memory of climbers and non-climbers
via Structure Dimensional Analysis (Schack, 2004; SDA; Schack,
2012). It was expected that climbers, but not non-climbers,
would categorize climbing holds according to appropriate grip
types (functional features) used in indoor climbing rather than
according to other object properties.
Experiment 2 was conducted to clarify whether or not the rep-
resentational clusters are actually associated with motor compo-
nents that fit the holds in climbers. A priming paradigm was used
with pictures of climbing holds as primes and grasping postures
as targets (e.g., Güldenpenning et al., 2011, 2013). Climbers were
expected to show different effects than non-climbers. Specifically,
climbers but not non-climbers should show a congruency effect,
i.e., facilitation by congruent primes and inhibition by incongru-
ent primes (Dehaene et al., 1998).
EXPERIMENT 1: CATEGORIZATION OF CLIMBING HOLDS
In indoor climbing, climbers have to manage routes of different
difficulty level, which requires a multitude of physical and cog-
nitive skills. Applying adequate grasp techniques to the available
climbing holds is one of the crucial tasks in this challenge, as it
enables the climber to master the route in a safe and efficient
way. Experiment 1 investigated if climbing holds are categorically
organized depending on their associated manual actions (i.e.,
adequate grip types) in the long-term memory of experienced
indoor climbers. Structure dimensional analysis (SDA; Schack,
2004, 2012) was applied to reveal the relevant representational
structures related in the long-term memory of climbers and non-
climbers. It was expected that climbers, but not non-climbers,
categorized climbing holds according to the appropriate grip
types. Previous studies using SDA showed that experts’ cluster
solutions referred to functionally structured mental representa-
tions of complex movements (Bläsing et al., 2009; Land et al.,
2013) or to objects affording similar actions (e.g., Stöckel et al.,
2012) representing functional action-based categories of partial
actions or objects.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-one participants voluntarily took part in Experiment 1
without any exchange or in exchange for course credit. Ten
students of sport science without any experience in indoor or
outdoor rock climbing, all from Bielefeld University, Germany,
were assigned to the non-climbers’ group (two females, all right-
handed, mean age 24.0 years, range 23–25). All non-climbers
were physically active (eight out of ten participants performed
individual sports, four performed team sports). The sports most
regularly performed by the participants of the non-athlete group
included soccer, basketball, fitness training, and running.
Eleven climbers (two females, all right-handed, mean age 27;
range 22–34) were recruited from an indoor climbing area, due
to their experiences in climbing (mean climbing experience: 5.3
years of training, 3.4 training sessions per week). Referring to
the Union Internationale des Associationes d’Alpinisme’s (UIAA)
grading system describing the difficulty of the climbing route,
participants’ indoor climbing skills ranged from 6 to 8 (two par-
ticipants climbed routes graded up to 8, five participants climbed
routes graded 7). Five of the climbers also regularly climbed
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outdoors, with skills corresponding to routes ranging from 5 to 7.
Additionally, five out of the ten climbers regularly performed
other sports (mostly mountain sports or running).
All participants reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were naive with regard to the purpose of
the experiment. All participants provided written informed con-
sent before testing started. The single experimental session lasted
about 30min. The experiment was performed in accordance with
the ethical standards of the sixth revision of the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki (World Medical Assocition, 2008).
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 16 colored photographs of climbing holds of
different shapes and sizes, as commonly used in indoor climbing
(see Figure 1). The holds were presented to match the climber’s
perspective, in adequate size relative to each other. All holds were
chosen to elicit specific grip types rather than being ambiguous or
non-specific. Six out of sixteen holds typically required a crimp
grip, four a sideways pull toward the body, four a pocket grip, and
two an open grip. This a priori attribution of climbing holds to
grip types was informed by climbing experts who did not partic-
ipate in the study and was used as reference for the results of the
experiment.
Design and procedure
The participants were tested individually while sitting in front of
a computer screen. An experimental paradigm named Structure
Dimensional Analysis (SDA; Schack, 2004, 2012) was applied to
investigate the categorization of climbing holds on the basis of
mental representations of specialist grip types in the long-term
memory of climbers and non-climbers. SDA was applied via
custom-made software (NetSplit). The stimuli were presented in
such a way that in each trial, the reference stimulus (or anchor)
occurred in the top position marked by a green frame, and the
stimulus directly below the reference, marked by a blue frame, had
to be assigned by key press to a positive (left) or negative (right)
list relative to the reference (see Figure 2). The anchor and the
active stimulus picture were presented on the screen with a size of
approximately 6 × 6 cm. The participants were instructed to indi-
cate by pressing one of two marked keys if the adequate grasping
action directed toward the currently active hold (marked blue)
would be of the same type as the one directed toward the climbing
hold in the reference position (marked green). Once the response
was given, the next trial began, in which the same anchor was pre-
sented with another of the remaining items, until all 15 items had
been judged as affording a similar or dissimilar grip compared to
the anchor; this procedure composed one block. In the next block,
a different hold was presented as anchor, in combination with all
remaining 15 holds. The whole experiment comprised 16 blocks
applied in randomized order, each block with a different item as
anchor, resulting in a total of 240 trials.
Data analyses
A hierarchical cluster analysis according to SDA (Lander and
Lange, 1996; Schack, 2004, 2012) was carried out on the data col-
lected via the previously described splitting procedure in order to
obtainmean cluster solutions for the two experimental groups. To
achieve this, the sorting task described as part of the experimental
FIGURE 1 | Stimulus pictures showing climbing holds commonly used in indoor climbing; this grouping of climbing holds according to grip types
was used as reference for the participants’ results.
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FIGURE 2 | Presentation of stimuli during the experiment. The
stimulus item in the top position, marked by a green frame, is the
current anchor (reference) relative to which the active stimulus
below, marked by a blue frame, has to be categorized as affording
a similar grip or affording a dissimilar grip. Items appearing in
smaller size left and right of the active item have already been
assigned to the positive list (similar grips) or to the negative list
(dissimilar grips), respectively.
procedure was applied to deliver a distance scaling between the
items (climbing holds). By this procedure, 16 decision trees were
established, as each item occupied once the reference position,
resulting in a 16 × 15 matrix of partial quantities in which val-
ues took either a negative or positive sign depending on whether
the item was judged as belonging to the positive or the neg-
ative list relative to the anchor (e.g., if 4 out of the 15 items
were assigned to the positive list, these items were each given the
value+4, whereas the remaining 11 features assigned to the nega-
tive list were each given the value −11). The resulting matrix was
then z-transformed for standardization and subsequently trans-
formed into a Euclidian distance matrix as basis for a hierarchical
cluster analysis (in accordance with the average-linkage-method).
Cluster solutions were determined using a critical Euclidian dis-
tance (dcrit), with all junctures lying below this value forming the
apical pole of an underlying concept cluster (for more details on
the method, see Schack, 2012). As reference structure, an a pri-
ori classification of stimulus climbing holds according to specific
grip types had been achieved based on interviews with climb-
ing experts who did not participate in the study (see Figure 1).
To calculate the similarity between mean group results with the
reference structure and to compare each individual participant’s
cluster solution with the averaged cluster solution of the group
and the reference structure (holds 1–6: crimp grip; holds 7–10:
sideways pull; holds 11–14: pocket grip; holds 15 and 16: open
grip; see also Figure 1), we used the adjusted rand index (ARI;
Rand, 1971; Santos and Embrechts, 2009). The ARI provides a
measure of similarity on a range between 0 and 1; a score of
0 indicates that two cluster solutions are independent, whereas
a score of 1 indicates that two cluster solutions are identical.
Scores between these two values indicate the degree of similar-
ity between cluster solutions; the higher the ARI score, the greater
is the similarity between the variables.
Results
The hierarchical cluster analysis revealed four clusters corre-
sponding to four grip types for the group of climbers, and three
smaller clusters for the non-climbers. The four clusters of the
climber group included all 16 holds into clusters that reflected
the correct assignment of holds to grip types (cluster 1: items 1–6,
cluster 2: 7–10, cluster 3: 11–14, cluster 4: 15 and 16). Euclidean
distances between the items of all clusters were all below 1.5 (criti-
cal value: 3.4, alpha value: 5%), which reflected a high consistency
of the climbers’ decisions. The non-climbers’ cluster solution con-
tained three clusters, consisting of items 2 to 6, 7 and 8, and 13 and
14. Euclidean distances were all larger than 1.5, and the remaining
seven items were singled out (i.e., were not significantly assigned
to any cluster). The mean group dendrograms for climbers and
non-climbers are presented in Figure 3.
To compare individual participants’ cluster solutions to the
groups’ mean cluster solutions, adjusted rand index (ARI, Santos
and Embrechts, 2009) was calculated, which expresses the extent
to which the individual cluster solutions differ from the respec-
tive averaged group dendrogram. Comparison of the mean group
cluster solutions with the reference structure resulted in an ARI
score of 1.0 for the climbers (i.e., both cluster solutions were
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FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 1: mean cluster solutions of groups;
top: climbers (N = 11); bottom: non-climbers (N = 10). Left: dendrograms;
alpha: 5%, dcrit (marked by a horizontal line): 3.4. Numbers on the x-axis refer to
the item numbers; numbers on the y-axis indicate Euclidean distance between
items according to the cluster analysis via SDA. Right: Stimulus pictures
representing cluster solutions.
identical) and of 0.535 for the non-climbers. Individual ARI
scores of the climbers ranged from 0.685 to 1.0, with a mean
of 0.952 ± 0.195 (SD). For the non-climbers, ARI scores were
smaller than the climbers’ (Mann-Whitney U-test; Z = −3.887,
p < 0.001), they ranged from 0.0 to 0.643, with a mean of
0.311 ± 0.206. When non-climbers’ ARI scores were calculated
with reference to the reference structure, they were also smaller
than the climbers’ (Z = −4.033, p < 0.001), ranging from 0.0
to 0.638, with a mean of 0.268 ± 0.194. The non-climbers’ ARI
scores calculated relative to the group average and the reference
structure did not differ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; Z = −1.836,
p = 0.066).
Discussion experiment 1
The hierarchical cluster analysis via SDA revealed four clusters for
the group of climbers, and three clusters for the group of non-
climbers. For the group of climbers, the mean cluster solution
was identical with the functional assignment of grasping holds
to grip types (see Figure 1), and individual participants’ cluster
solutions differed only little from each other; nine out of eleven
participants produced a result that was identical with the mean
cluster solution. Euclidean distances between items within each
cluster were all below 1.5, and thereby small compared to the
critical value (dcrit = 3.4). These results point toward a high con-
sistency of decisions made by participants during the experiment,
within as well as between participants. These findings suggests
that climbers, on the basis of their experience in indoor climb-
ing, could easily associate the presented climbing holds to the
corresponding grip types, thereby producing consistent clusters
representing functional task-related categories.
In contrast, the non-climbers’ mean cluster solution included
only nine out of 16 items into clusters, whereas the remaining
seven items remained as singletons (that is, these seven items
were not categorized by the non-climbers, reflecting a partly non-
categorical representation). The three clusters each contained
items that belonged to the same grip category. This finding could
be explained by two mechanisms: despite their lack of climbing
experience, non-climbers might have been able to assign certain
climbing holds to appropriate grip types, potentially based on
their experience with manipulable objects from a non-climbing
context. Non-climbers thereby might have applied the same (or
similar) criteria as climbers, but succeeded in doing so only for
a subset of the presented items. In this case, the results reflect
that attribution to a specific grip type was more difficult for cer-
tain climbing holds than for others (e.g., the appropriate grip that
required inserting one or more fingers into openings in the hold
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was apparently easier to recognize for items 13 and 14 than for
items 11 and 12).
Alternatively, non-climbers might have grouped items on the
basis of other feature-based object similarities related to shape or
even color. The latter explanation is supported by the observa-
tion that items grouped into the same cluster by the non-climbers
looked similar (this is particularly obvious for items 7 and 8 and
for items 13 and 14, respectively). Previous studies have shown
that novice participants often tend to combine items that show
similarity regarding superficial characteristics, rather than task-
related functional dependence, into the same cluster (see Schack,
2004). In studies that use partial movements (or basic action con-
cepts, see e.g., Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Schack and Ritter,
2009) in order to investigate mental representations of complex
movements, such characteristics often regard the use of body
parts (e.g., movement concepts referring to the arms might be
combined into one separate cluster, even though this might have
no relevance for the functional structure of the movement, as
armmovements might have different and even opposed functions
during different movement phases). The results suggest that the
non-climbers, due to their lack of task-related experience, were
less able than the climbers to decide consistently which specific
grips were required for the presented climbing holds.
These findings corroborate the notion that the categorization
of visually perceived objects is fundamentally influenced by their
potential for interaction (i.e., their affordances; Gibson, 1977),
the evaluation of which strongly depends on the observer’s task-
specific experience and expertise. For task-specific objects such
as climbing holds, certain features determine their potential use
and are, therefore, relevant for functional categorization, whereas
other features play a minor role. Climbers, compared to non-
climbers, choose more purposefully which of the characteristics
of a climbing hold are relevant for the task in question. (In the
current study, shape and orientation were task-relevant features,
whereas in a different context, the color of climbing holds could
be a task-relevant object feature, as it would allow the climber to
view the hold as part of a color-coded route).
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 show that the
cognitive representation of objects (i.e., climbing holds) strongly
depends on their functional relation to action-based experi-
ences. Based on this finding, we investigated in the subsequent
experiment with similar stimuli and two similar groups of partic-
ipants if and to what extent the perception of task-related objects
influences (short-term) processing and the (pre-)activation of
object-related actions.
EXPERIMENT 2: COGNITIVE ACTIVATION OF GRASPING
POSTURES
Experiment 2 investigated whether visually perceiving a climb-
ing hold activates the grasping posture commonly associated with
this climbing hold. Moreover, it was asked whether the activation
of the grasping postures depends on the manipulation experi-
ences with the climbing holds. In a priming experiment, climbers
and non-climbers were asked to decide whether a presented target
picture reflected a crimp grip or a sideways pull. The preced-
ing prime picture either depicted a climbing hold requiring the
grip shown in the target picture (congruent condition; e.g., a
hold requiring a sideways pull followed by a sideways pull) or the
alternative grip (incongruent condition; e.g., a hold requiring a
sideways pull followed by a crimp grip). Moreover, two unspe-
cific conditions were applied. In the positive unspecific condition,
the target picture was preceded by a climbing hold which could
both be grasped with a crimp grip as well as a sideways pull. In
the negative unspecific condition, the preceding climbing hold
could neither be grasped with a crimp grip nor with a sideways
pull.
It was expected that in experienced climbers a climbing hold
would activate the grasping posture commonly associated with
the climbing hold, and thus influence responses to the tar-
get picture depicting a particular grasping posture (i.e., crimp
grip vs. sideways pull). No such activation was expected in par-
ticipants without manipulation experience with the climbing
holds. Moreover, for both groups it was expected that unspecific
climbing holds would not activate any grasping posture.
The following three predictions were made: first, a congruency
effect was expected for participants with climbing experience; that
is, faster response times under conditions in which a climbing
hold shown in the prime picture would require the same grasp-
ing posture as depicted in the following target picture, and slower
response times under conditions in which a climbing hold would
require the alternative grasping posture as shown in the target
picture. Second, no congruency effect was expected for partici-
pants without specific climbing experience. Third, for climbers,
response latencies in the unspecific condition were predicted to be
in between the congruent and the incongruent condition, whereas
for non-climbers, response times should not vary between con-
ditions. The described differences between groups related to the
factor congruency are expected to be statistically indicated by an
interaction between group and congruency.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty two participants voluntarily took part without any
exchange or in exchange for course credit. Eighteen students or
employees from Bielefeld University, Germany, were assigned to
the non-climber group (three female, one left-handed, mean age
29.6; range 23–43). Participants of the non-climber group had no
experience in climbing. All non-climbers were physically active,
performing at least one type of sport (11 participants performed
individual sports, 12 performed team sports, 2 performed com-
petitive sports, 2 performed racket sport). Participants of the
non-climber group played, for example, soccer, handball, bas-
ketball, or regularly performed swimming, running, or fitness
training.
Fourteen climbers (one female, two left-handed, mean age
30.0; range 16–43) were recruited from an indoor climbing
area for their experiences in climbing (mean training expe-
rience: 8.7 years; mean training frequency per week: 4.0 ses-
sions). All recruited climbers were members of the Deutscher
Alpenverein (German Alpine Association). Referring to the UIAA
grading system describing the difficulty of climbing routes, par-
ticipants’ climbing skills ranged between 6 and 10 (two par-
ticipants were able to climb routes graded 6, two participants
climbed routes graded 7, six participants climbed routes graded
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8, three participants climbed routes graded 9, and one participant
climbed routes graded 10).
All participants reported to have normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive with regard to the purpose of
the experiment. All participants provided written informed con-
sent before testing started. The single experimental session lasted
about 20min. The experiment was performed in accordance with
the ethical standards of the sixth revision of the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki (World Medical Assocition, 2008).
Apparatus and stimuli
For stimulus presentation and data collection, a Toshiba
Notebook with a 17 inch VGA-Display (vertical retraces 60Hz)
and the software Presentation® (version 14.8) was used. The soft-
ware controlled the presentation of the stimuli and measured
reaction times. Responses had to be given by pressing one of two
external response buttons connected via a parallel port with the
notebook.
The target pictures were 16 photographs of hands in grasping
postures. Eight pictures reflected a crimp grip and eight pictures
reflected a sideways pull. Half of the grasping postures reflected a
right hand and half of the postures reflected a left hand (images
were mirrored) which were used equally often.
As prime pictures, 32 photographs of climbing holds were
presented. All climbing holds were red. Four of the climbing
holds would require a crimp grip, and four climbing holds would
require a sideways pull. Moreover, four climbing holds could be
grasped with a crimp grip or a sideways pull (positive unspecific
climbing holds). Last, four climbing holds would require a grip
that was different from a crimp grip or a sideways pull (negative
unspecific climbing hold). The 16 pictures of the climbing holds
were mirrored vertically to extend the spectrum of the stimulus
material to 32 prime pictures in total. An exemplary illustration
of the stimulus material is given in Figure 4.
The background of the climbing holds and of the grasping
postures was an indoor climbing wall (see Figure 4). The stim-
uli had a size of 9.2 × 9.2 cm (346 × 346 pixels). All stimuli were
presented centrally on a black background and subtended a visual
angle of 8.9◦ horizontally and vertically from the viewing distance
of 60 cm.
Design and procedure
The present study used a 4 × 2 mixed factorial design with the
within-subject factor congruency (congruent condition, incon-
gruent condition, positive and negative unspecific condition)
and participants’ expertise as between-subject factor (climbers vs.
non-climbers). The impact of these factors was analyzed with
reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) measures as the dependent
variables.
Participants sat in front of a computer screen (60 cm) and
were instructed in written form to classify the presented tar-
get picture as a crimp grip or as a sideways pull as quickly as
possible by pressing one of the two response buttons with the
index finger. Moreover, participants were instructed to respond
as accurately as possible. The response button assignment was
counterbalanced across participants within each group. Before
starting the experimental session, each participant performed ten
randomized practice trials. Data from this practice block were
not analyzed. The following test block consisted of 128 pseudo-
randomized prime-target pairs. Each prime picture appeared four
times and was either combined with a left hand or right hand
crimp grip or with a left hand or right hand sideways pull. The
presentation of the order of the prime-target pairs was completely
randomized.
Each trial started with the presentation of a central fixa-
tion cross (400ms), followed by a blank screen (100ms), the
prime (100ms), a second blank screen (100ms), and the tar-
get (which remained visible on the screen until a response was
FIGURE 4 | Examples of the stimulus material used in Experiment 2. On the left side examples for each type of climbing hold are given. On the right side
examples for each type of grasping posture are presented.
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given). Incorrect responses elicited the word “Fehler” (German
for “error”). An inter-trial interval of 1500ms elapsed before
the next trial started. The within-trial procedure is illustrated in
Figure 5.
RESULTS
Data analyses
Reaction times (RTs) were screened for outliers using a total cut
off. RTs below 200ms and above 1000ms were excluded (2.0%).
Trials with wrong answers (3.4%) were not used in the analy-
sis of the RTs. The mean RTs from the factorial combinations of
the within-subjects factor congruency and the between-subjects
factor expertise were computed for further analysis. A prelimi-
nary comparison of the RTs for positive unspecific primes and
negative unspecific primes was performed. Separate paired t-
tests revealed neither a significant difference between positive
(547ms, s.e.m. = 21ms) and negative unspecific primes (552ms,
s.e.m. = 22ms) for climbers, t(13) = 0.56, p = 0.59, nor for pos-
itive (529ms, s.e.m. = 14ms) and negative unspecific primes
(535ms, s.e.m. = 14ms) for non-climbers, t(17) = 0.98, p =
0.34. This result indicates that positive unspecific primes and neg-
ative unspecific primes did not evoke differential priming effects.
Thus, further analyses were computed with the mean value of
positive unspecific and negative unspecific primes. This param-
eter value of the factor congruency was simply termed neutral
condition.
Mixed ANOVAs with the within-subjects factor congruency
(congruent, incongruent, neutral) and the between-subjects fac-
tor expertise (climbers vs. non-climbers) were performed with
RT and ER as dependent variables. A violation of the sphericity-
assumption resulted in a correction of the p-values according to
Greenhouse-Geisser1.
Reaction times
The within subjects factor congruency reached significance,
F(1, 60) = 4.86, p = 0.01, ε = 0.84, η2p = 0.14, as well as the
1A violation of the sphericity-assumption requires modifications of the
degrees of freedom (df s) to reduce the Type I error. The estimates for this
modification is denoted by epsilon (ε) providing a measure of deviation from
sphericity. An epsilon of 1 indicates that sphericity is exactly met, smaller
epsilon values indicate increasing deviation. Due to better reading, the uncor-
rected df s are given for the F-value, but the corrected df s can be easily
calculated by multiplying the original df s with ε.
interaction between congruency and expertise, F(2, 60) = 3.88, p =
0.03, ε = 0.84, η2p = 0.12. The between subjects factor expertise
did not reach significance (p = 0.75).
To illuminate the source of the interaction, paired t-tests were
performed separately for climbers (one-tailed) and non-climbers
(two-tailed). Climbers responded significantly faster to congru-
ent compared to incongruent prime-target pairs, t(13) = 2.52,
p = 0.01. Responses to grasping postures preceded by a neu-
tral prime were significantly slower than responses to congruent
prime-target pairs, t(13) = 2.02, p = 0.03, and significantly faster
than responses to incongruent prime-target pairs, t(13) = 1.89,
p = 0.04.
Non-climbers in contrast responded not differently fast (p =
0.72) to grasping postures preceded by a congruent climbing hold
and by an incongruent climbing hold. Interestingly, responses
to grasping postures preceded by a neutral climbing hold
were significantly faster than congruent, t(17) = 2.18, p = 0.04,
and also faster than incongruent climbing holds, t(17) = 2.78,
p = 0.01.
Mean values of the RTs and ERs and corresponding confidence
intervals are illustrated in Figure 6 and additionally displayed in
Data Sheet 1 in the Supplementary Material.
Response errors
A mixed ANOVA on the mean ERs neither revealed a significant
effect for the within subjects factor congruency (p = 0.23) nor for
the between subjects factor expertise (p = 0.60). The interaction
between congruency and expertise reached statistical significance,
F(2, 60) = 4.30, p = 0.01, ε = 0.82, η2p = 0.17. To compare the
results of the analysis of the RTs with the ERs, paired t-tests were
computed separately for climbers (one-tailed) and non-climbers
(two-tailed).
For climbers, responding was less error-prone with congruent
compared to incongruent trials, t(13) = 2.80, p = 0.01. The com-
parison between the incongruent and the neutral condition also
reached statistical significance, t(13) = 2.8, p = 0.01, indicating
a higher ER for incongruent compared to neutral prime-target
pairs. The comparison between the congruent and the neutral
condition did not reach significance (p = 0.27).
For non-climbers, none of the comparisons revealed a signif-
icant effect (all ps > 0.30), but the error rate was slightly smaller
for incongruent primes compared to congruent and neutral
primes.
FIGURE 5 | Stimulus presentation in Experiment 2. This figure reflects the within-trial procedure for an example of the incongruent condition: a climbing
hold requiring a crimp grip is followed by a target picture depicting a sideways pull.
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FIGURE 6 | Results of Experiment 2: Reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds
with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and error rates (ERs)
in percent with corresponding 95% CIs for climbers (left panel) and
non-climbers (right panel). The dashed lines display RTs scaled on the left
vertical axis. The bars illustrate ERs scaled on the right vertical axis. The
prime-target conditions are labeled on the x-axis.
Discussion experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to investigate the activation of grasping
postures by visually presenting climbing holds and how such acti-
vation is influenced by skill level. In accordance with the hypothe-
ses, a congruency effect was found for climbers, that is, faster
responses were found for congruent trials compared to incongru-
ent trials. The inclusion of an unspecific condition revealed that
the found congruency effect is based both on speeded responses
in the congruent condition and on slowed responses in the incon-
gruent condition compared to the neutral baseline. It would be
interesting to determine whether this priming effect arises at
the perceptual level (perceptual priming, e.g., Biederman and
Cooper, 1992), the cognitive level (e.g., Labeye et al., 2008), or
at a motor stage of processing (response priming; e.g., Kunde
et al., 2003). Regarding a perceptual locus of the priming effects,
there is no visual relation or similarity between the climbing
holds and the grasping postures that is larger for the congruent
prime target pairs (hold-posture) compared to the incongruent
pairs. Hence, we consider it implausible that our priming effects
are due to perceptual (dis)similarity of the stimuli. Regarding a
potential motor locus, the priming effect is unlikely to reflect a
response activation or a response competition effect because the
task instruction to classify a grasping posture as a crimp grip or
as a sideways pull cannot directly be applied to the climbing hold
pictures (primes). That is, the holds themselves should not acti-
vate or elicit a response per se (i.e., pressing a left or right response
button). Therefore, we would argue that the priming effects do
not arise during perceptual or motor stages but during cognitive
processing stages.
More precisely, the result pattern of speeded responses in con-
gruent trials and slowed responses in incongruent trials, both
relative to a neutral baseline, points toward two cognitive pro-
cessing mechanisms. First, the perception of a given hold leads
to an activation of the representation of that hold including the
corresponding grasping action. Second, the perception of a given
hold seems to lead to a reduced availability of non-corresponding
grasping actions. These mechanisms of action activation and
action inhibition might help to explain the efficient selection of
grasping actions in climbing.
The results found in the non-climbers are also in accordance
with the interpretation of a cognitive locus of the priming effects.
Participants with no climbing experience are expected to pos-
sess no representations of climbing-specific grasping actions.
Accordingly, non-climbers did not show any congruency effect.
Unexpectedly, however, non-climbers had shorter reaction times
for unspecific prime-target pairs compared to congruent und
incongruent ones. Besides the possibility that this finding might
be a random finding in principle, a possible post-hoc explana-
tion for this result could be the following. Round objects similar
to the unspecific climbing holds are also common in daily life,
for example, as round rotatable button on a washing machine
or as knob-like hold of a drawer. It is thus possible that non-
climbers applied their general knowledge, that round objects
can be grasped either with a crimp grip or with a sideways
pull (without knowing these climbing specific concepts), to the
predominantly round shapes of climbing holds in the neutral
condition. In contrast, non-climbers could not infer any associ-
ated grasping action from the unfamiliar climbing holds requiring
a crimp grip or a sideways pull. The faster responses to targets
following a prime picture with a round hold thus may reflect
unspecific activations of grasping representations. Further studies
are needed to confirm this suggestion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study explored the relationship between the action-based
cognitive representations of climbing holds and the object-based
activation of the corresponding grasping actions. Experiment 1
investigated the structure of skill representations. (Note that we
use the term climbing skill in this context specifically for the
skilled manual use of climbing holds, i.e., the knowledge of cor-
rect grip application for individual climbing holds.) The results
of Experiment 1 suggest that climbers organize visually perceived
climbing holds categorically according to functional features (i.e.,
how to grasp in an indoor climbing context). Non-climbers, in
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contrast, showed an organizational structure that was not cate-
gorical in terms of skill-based (climbing) knowledge but rather
based on unspecific world knowledge or superficial object fea-
tures (e.g., form or color). Experiment 2 investigated the access
of grasping knowledge, in particular whether and how functional
features (i.e., grasping postures) are activated by object features
(i.e., shapes of climbing holds). Here, we found evidence for
activation of matching grasping postures and inhibition of non-
matching grasping postures by the perception of grip-specific
holds.
We argue that in climbers, but not in non-climbers, the cat-
egorical memory structure reflects the functional features of
climbing holds in the context of indoor climbing. This struc-
ture appears to follow functional distinctions of the associated
actions and reflects climbers’ manifold experiences of task-related
action-effect coupling (Hoffmann, 2003). The qualitative changes
in memory structures might also change perceptual information
processing (cf. Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995). Having command
over, for example, a grip category related to sideways pull would
facilitate the recognition and processing of potentially distinct
holds regarding their applicability and functional relevance for
the adequate motor action. The present findings thus provide
insights as to how skilled climbers may achieve a better climbing
performance: automatic activation of adequate grasping actions
in response to the perception of a specific climbing hold can be
regarded as crucial mechanism to reduce the cognitive demands
involved in decision making and the planning of selected motor
actions. This mechanism thereby serves to reduce cognitive pro-
cessing time, which, importantly in the climbing context, leads to
reduced physical energy costs (i.e., muscle force needed to remain
in a static posture while evaluating the next move). Climbing
thereby represents a relevant example of how skill-based knowl-
edge that can be accessed explicitly for cognitive control also
supports evaluative, strategic action planning under resource
constrained conditions.
Our results are in accordance with findings by Pezzulo et al.
(2010) who reported better recall performance for difficult climb-
ing routes in climbers compared with non-climbers. Pezzulo et al.
(2010, p. 72) speculate that experts are better able to form motor
chunks that are necessary for mastering perceived climbing routes
by means of simulation and hence are better in memorizing the
routes, but these authors also consider alternative explanations
such as better visual imagery in experts. Whereas Pezzulo et al.
(2010) used an offline measure of memorization, Experiment
2 in our study investigated online processing (i.e., short-term
activation) of skill representations which are suggested to be
categorically structured according to our Experiment 1.
The assumption of categorical skill representations raises the
question of how specific actions are selected. Generally, it is con-
ceivable that some holds have multiple grasping possibilities and
should, thus, activate more than one category of climbing holds.
Here, Experiment 2 yielded evidence for processes of activation
and inhibition. The results of Experiment 2 are also in accordance
with Labeye et al. (2008) who also found that the perception of
(manipulable) objects activates associated actions, even though
we used considerably longer stimulus onset asynchronies com-
pared to Labeye et al. (2008). Moreover, Experiment 2 suggests
that such action feature activations depend on previous learning
or experience with the object and not on the pure physical object
properties as the non-climbers’ data pattern showed the fastest
responses in the unspecific conditions.
Our results corroborate findings from studies of complex
movement representations (Bläsing et al., 2009; Güldenpenning
et al., 2011, 2013; Weigelt et al., 2011; Land et al., 2013) and
skill acquisition (Frank et al., 2013). They emphasize the role of
cognitive representations and processes in action control and sup-
port the view that skill representations are based on categorical
knowledge. In this regard, our study confirms the role of cognitive
processes in the control of complex human actions as proposed
in frameworks such as the ideomotor approach (Koch et al., 2004;
for a histoical overview of the ideo-motor principle, see Stock and
Stock, 2004), the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel et al.,
2001), or the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A;
Schack and Ritter, 2009; Land et al., 2013).
Taken together, the present studies investigated the cognitive
representations of indoor climbing holds and the perceptual pro-
cessing of such holds and associated grasping postures in climbers
and non-climbers. Experienced climbers represent holds accord-
ing to their functions (i.e., grip types) whereas non-climbers show
less structure in their representations and organize these accord-
ing to unspecific action knowledge or superficial features. It was
also found that the perception of climbing holds activates the
matching grasping posture and inhibits non-matching postures
in climbers but not in non-climbers. These findings suggest a
processing advantage and mechanism of categorical action repre-
sentations. Furthermore, the findings show that action experience
modifies the relevant object representations by associating action
features to the representations of corresponding objects.
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